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 NOTE 
When Arbitration Agreement Provisions 
Time Travel: Illusory Promises and 
Continued At-Will Employment in Baker 
Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
RICHARD C. BYRD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Left unrestrained, Baker v. Bristol Care1 may quietly revolutionize Mis-
souri law regarding employment agreements of many kinds.  Baker is a recent 
Supreme Court of Missouri case favoring an employee’s position for denial 
of an employer’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a purported em-
ployment and arbitration agreement.  The court considered the agreement in 
question to be unsupported by consideration, as neither continued at-will em-
ployment, nor an illusory promise to arbitrate on the part of the employer, 
were found to be adequate consideration.  Of particular note was the court’s 
fatal interpretation of a provision of the purported agreement.  This provision 
would have given the employer, with 30-days’ notice to the employee, unilat-
eral power to amend or revoke at least the arbitration portion of the parties’ 
purported agreement.  The court interpreted this provision as granting retroac-
tive, and not merely prospective, authority to the employer. 
This case is an important development of Missouri employer-employee 
contract law following the 2008 case of Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.2  It 
heals an apparent rift between Missouri’s law on this matter and the federal 
courts’ interpretation thereof.  Depending on other courts’ use of the decision 
in the future, Baker may have sweeping effects on all agreements – not mere-
ly arbitration agreements – between at-will employees and employers in the 
future.  These implications, and how employers and employees might act to 
create arbitration agreements in light of Baker, will be explored below. 
First, this Note discusses the particular facts of the Baker case, including 
its procedural history and holding.  Then, the history of salient cases and law 
is covered in three main areas related to Baker, specifically the concept of 
arbitrability, at-will employment’s status as effective consideration, and when 
 
* B.S.B.A, Business Administration, Saint Louis University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2016.  I thank Professor Thom Lambert for his 
positive outlook and assistance on this Note. 
 1. Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770 (Mo. 2014) (en banc), reh’g 
denied (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 2. Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
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courts find promises to be illusory.  Following that, this Note summarizes the 
court’s decision in Baker and its lengthy and thorough dissent.  Finally, this 
note discusses the significance of this case in relation to both the history of 
the topics involved and their application going forward. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
The parties involved in Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc. were appellants Da-
vid Furnell (“Furnell”) and Bristol Care, Inc. d/b/a Bristol Manor (“Bristol”) 
and respondent Carla Baker (“Baker”).3  Baker was a former employee of 
Bristol Care, and Furnell was the President of Bristol.4  After Baker attempt-
ed to bring a class action against Bristol, Bristol sought to compel arbitra-
tion.5  Bristol appealed the overruling of this motion to the Supreme Court of 
Missouri.6  It made this motion pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Sec-
tions 435.3557 and 435.440, which permitted appeal “from an order denying 
an application to compel arbitration . . . .”8 
Bristol and Baker had signed employment and arbitration agreements, 
both of which were prepared by Bristol at the same time that Baker received a 
promotion from Bristol.9  This promotion included a change in pay-scheme 
from hourly to salary, and Baker was given a role as manager in one of Bris-
tol’s long-term care-providing locations.10  Under the employment agree-
ment, Baker’s employment was to “continue indefinitely” unless either Baker 
provided 60 days’ notice or Bristol chose to end her employment in any one 
of four ways.11  The parties’ signed arbitration agreement identified the con-
sideration as “Baker’s continued employment and mutual promises to resolve 
claims through arbitration,” however the agreement also said that it would 
“not alter [Baker]’s status as an at-will employee” and “that Bristol specifi-
cally ‘reserves the right to amend, modify, or revoke this agreement upon 
thirty (30) days’ prior written notice to [Baker].’”12  Baker commenced her 
 
 3. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 772. 
 4. Id. at 773. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  The court identified these four ways as 
(1) with five days’ written notice “at [Bristol’s] sole option”; (2) without no-
tice if Bristol paid Baker five days’ compensation; (3) without notice if, in 
Bristol’s “sole opinion,” Baker violates the employment agreement in a way 
that “jeopardizes the general operation of the facility or the care, comfort or 
security of its residents”; or (4) without notice for “dishonesty, insubordina-
tion, moral turpitude or incompetence.” 
Id. 
 12. Id. 
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class action after being removed from her employment with Bristol.  The 
class action sought recovery for purportedly unpaid overtime, and this led 
Bristol, in turn, to make its motion to compel arbitration.13 
Bristol argued in favor of enforcing the arbitration clause, pointing to 
the arbitrator as the one who ought to resolve a dispute over enforceability.14  
For its argument, Bristol relied on the arbitration agreement itself, which stat-
ed, “The arbitrator has exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to 
applicability or enforceability of this Agreement.”15  Bristol advanced, in 
favor of the arbitration agreement’s validity, that “there are two sources of 
considerations for the arbitration agreement: (1) Baker’s promotion, contin-
ued employment and attendant benefits; and (2) Bristol’s promise to arbitrate 
its claims arising out of the employment relationship between it and Baker 
and to assume costs of arbitration.”16  Baker denied the existence of any con-
sideration needed to find the purported agreement valid and instead argued 
that she remained an at-will employee despite the promotion.17 
The Missouri Circuit Court of DeKalb County ruled against Bristol’s at-
tempt to compel arbitration.18  The circuit court apparently agreed with Baker 
that the arbitration agreement in question was illusory.19  The Missouri Court 
of Appeals for the Western District, in a one paragraph order, affirmed the 
circuit court’s determination as being without error.20  After a motion to 
transfer, the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri.21 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment, consistent with 
the circuit court’s order, finding the arbitration agreement to be without con-
sideration and therefore invalid.22  Specifically, the instant court found that 
“Baker’s continued at-will employment and Bristol’s promise to resolve 
claims through arbitration d[id] not provide consideration to form a valid 
arbitration agreement.”23  Therefore, the court held that when the only candi-
dates for consideration to support a purported arbitration agreement are con-
tinued at-will employment and an illusory, “unilaterally and retroactively” 
alterable promise to engage in arbitration, the purported agreement is without 
consideration and therefore invalid.24 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 773-74. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 774. 
 17. Id. at 775. 
 18. Id. at 770. 
 19. Id. at 772-73; Brief for Respondent at 22, Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 
S.W.3d 770 (Mo. 2014) (en banc), reh’g denied (Oct. 28, 2014) (No. WD75035), 
2012 WL 5971088, at *22. 
 20. Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 2013 WL 1587882, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 21. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 770. 
 22. Id. at 772. 
 23. Id. at 777. 
 24. Id. at 776-77. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Arbitrability 
The State of Missouri has maintained the provisions of the Missouri 
Uniform Arbitration Act since at least 1980.25  This Act states in relevant 
part, “A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration . . 
. is valid . . . save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.”26  This mirrors the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) 
statutory language that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall 
be valid . . . save upon such grounds as exist . . . for the revocation of any 
contract.”27  This act supports the Federal government’s “strong . . . policy in 
favor of arbitration.”28 
Similarly to the instant case, sometimes a court will be asked to deter-
mine a “question of arbitrability,” that is, “gateway matters [like] whether 
parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether concededly bind-
ing arbitration applies to a certain type of controversy.”29  The Supreme Court 
of the United States has presumed these gateway issues to be for courts to 
decide.30  The Supreme Court of Missouri has not refrained from resolving 
questions of arbitration agreement formation.31  The court in Dunn Industrial 
Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, consistent with the Supreme Court of the 
United States, held that “doubts as to arbitrability should be resolved in favor 
of coverage.”32  Before “parties are forced to submit to arbitration,” the court 
should determine “whether the parties contractually agreed to arbitration.”33  
In following this “limited inquiry to determine whether a valid agreement to 
arbitrate exists,” the Missouri courts would be acting consistently with the 
 
 25. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 28. Kenney v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 2009 WL 102682, at *2 (D. Kan. 2009). 
 29. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013).  But 
see Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 774 (distinguishing a 2010 Supreme Court case in which 
arbitration was compelled when the party delegated authority to the arbitrator to re-
solve disputes of contract formation). 
 30. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 n.2. 
 31. See State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858-59 (Mo. 2006) 
(en banc); Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc); State ex rel. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d 126, 128 
(Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 32. Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc., 112 S.W.3d at 429. 
 33. Finney v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d 393, 394-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2006). 
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and would not be violating the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.34 
B.  At-Will Employment as Consideration 
The at-will employment doctrine, in which “an employer may terminate 
an . . . employee ‘for any reason or for no reason,’” is “well-established Mis-
souri Law.”35  Along with the ability to terminate an employee’s course of 
employment without any reason at all, Missouri courts have considered the 
lack of a contract that states a definite length of employment when determin-
ing whether an at-will employment relationship exists.36  There have never-
theless been some restrictions and exceptions to this broad at-will employ-
ment doctrine permitting employee termination.37 
Missouri courts in the past have held that, at least where non-
competition agreements are concerned, “[a]n employer’s continuance of em-
ployment, where continuance is not required, supplies adequate consideration 
. . . .”38  That this understanding of consideration might have been extended 
to arbitration agreements was shown by the 2010 case of Kunzie v. Jack-In-
The-Box, Inc.39  In that case, the court distinguished a prior case in which 
“continuance in employment . . . supplie[d] adequate consideration for a non-
competition agreement,” not by limiting that case’s applicability only to non-
competition agreements, but by identifying that “the dispositive issue [was] 
not one of consideration, but of . . . mutual agreement and acceptance.”40 
If the consideration-fulfilling effect of continuance of at-will employ-
ment ever could have been so extended, its chances were cut short in 2008 by 
the hallmark case of Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,41 “the seminal case 
addressing . . . contract elements in the context of enforceability of an arbitra-
 
 34. Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994); see Frye 
v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 436 n.12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 35. Margiotta v. Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 36. Absent an employment contract with a “definite statement of duration[,] . . . 
an employment at will is created.”  Luethans v. Wash. Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169, 172 
(Mo. 1995) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Keveney v. Mo. Military 
Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); McCoy v. Spelman Mem’l Hosp., 845 
S.W.2d 727, 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 37. Margiotta, 315 S.W.3d at 346.  Some examples include race, religion, and 
certain public-policy exceptions.  Id. 
 38. Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998); see Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Bailenson, 537 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1976). 
 39. 330 S.W.3d 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 40. Id. at 484-85. 
 41. Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
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tion provision against at-will employees.”42  Morrow stood for the proposi-
tions that, in that court’s evaluation of the enforceability of Hallmark’s arbi-
tration program, “[t]erms and conditions of at-will employment are not en-
forceable at law as contractual duties” and “at-will employment, by its very 
moment-by-moment nature, is not a legally enforceable contract of employ-
ment.”43  Since Morrow, other cases have partially confirmed the Morrow 
court’s take on some of these propositions.44 
On the issue of the validity of the continuance of at-will employment as 
consideration, at least a handful of other jurisdictions have held contrary to 
Morrow.  The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Soto v. State Industrial Prod-
ucts, Inc. collected a variety of these cases and found that, as of the date of 
Soto, at least nine other courts, each applying (or attempting to apply) their 
respective states’ laws, agreed that “continued employment . . . [is] sufficient 
consideration to render [an arbitration] agreement enforceable.”45  This same 
case identified three other courts that held otherwise, including Morrow.46  
Furthermore, Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems, a case heard by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1982, included the issue of continued at-will 
employment as consideration, and the court there particularly looked for 
“raises or promotions” before finding an employment contract unenforceable 
and thus strongly implied that a raise or promotion would have been suffi-
cient consideration to uphold the contract.47 
C.  Illusory Promises in Arbitration Agreements 
An illusory promise, “where ‘[i]n effect, the agreement allows [the em-
ployer] to hold its employees to [a] promise . . . while reserving its own es-
cape hatch,’” without restrictions on the employer itself, has generally not 
been found to be valid consideration for an arbitration agreement.48  In Mis-
souri, recent cases have shown that arbitration agreements that are otherwise 
without consideration cannot themselves be considered binding mutual 
agreements unless the agreement was truly mutual and the employer did not 
try to “possess[] the unilateral right to modify” or back out of the agree-
 
 42. Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 43. Morrow, 273 S.W.3d at 26-27. 
 44. See Whitworth v. McBride & Son Homes, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 730, 741 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2011); Frye, 321 S.W.3d at 438 (“On appeal, Speedway has not asserted that 
the continuation of at-will employment constitutes consideration for Kimberly’s 
waiver of her right to access to the courts.  Such an argument would have been inef-
fective, in light of Morrow.”). 
 45. Soto v. State Indus. Prod., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 46. Id. at 75 n.6. 
 47. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 681, 703-04 (Minn. 
1982). 
 48. Canales v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 119, 124-25 (D. Me. 
2012) (quoting Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
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ment.49  Morrow has again shown itself to be relevant.  In Morrow, the court 
would not play along with an employer’s attempt to put substance into its 
purported promise by averring (during litigation) that its ability to modify an 
arbitration program can be exercised “only prospectively,” so that the em-
ployer “could not unilaterally refuse to pay for [or participate in] arbitra-
tion.”50  The purported arbitration program language in such a situation may 
be construed even to the contradiction of these later assertions.51 
A Missouri appellate court and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit sought express language to construe an arbitration agree-
ment’s clause as exclusively prospective but found none.52  However, the 
Missouri appellate case of Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac explicitly did 
not decide “whether the unilateral right to amend an agreement on mere ad-
vance notice . . . comports with settled principles of contract law in Missouri . 
. . .”53  This was because in Frye the alternative dispute resolution program 
used did not require the employer, Speedway, to give advance notification.54  
The 2012 California case of Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. cited the 
Fifth Circuit decision in Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc.55  The Peleg 
court followed Carey by looking for a “savings clause preventing any chang-
es from having retroactive effect” to determine whether the relevant arbitra-
tion provision was illusory, rather than finding that a notice period and re-
quirement “by itself, [would] make the [arbitration] [a]greement enforcea-
ble.”56  In Carey, which was cited by Baker, such a clause was known as a 
“Haliburton type savings clause,”57 after the Texas case of In re Halliburton 
Company.58 
The cases mentioned above that would interpret, without explicit and 
sufficient restrictions, an “escape” clause of an arbitration agreement to apply 
retroactively seem to be in tension with the Missouri precedent for construing 
language in favor of enforcing agreements.  A Supreme Court of Missouri 
case from 1968 opined: “Where an agreement is susceptible of two construc-
tions, one of which renders the contract invalid and the other sustains its va-
 
 49. Whitworth v. McBride & Son Homes, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2011); see Clemmons v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 
503, 506-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 50. Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15, 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 208-09 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 444-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 53. Frye, 321 S.W.3d at 444. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 60-61 (2012); Car-
ey, 669 F.3d at 207-09 (finding arbitration agreement provision that permitted em-
ployer to amend agreement was retroactively applicable and thus illusory). 
 56. Peleg, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 60-61(quoting Carey, 669 F.3d at 207) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 57. Carey, 669 F.3d at 206. 
 58. In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002). 
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lidity, the latter construction is preferred.”59  Accordingly, as recently as 
2013, a Missouri appellate court cited language that disfavored “the destruc-
tion of agreements” and eschewed construction that “render[ed] other terms 
meaningless or illusory.”60  Such a beneficent construction must, of course, 
be “reasonably available.”61 
Frye, decided subsequent to Morrow, identified an open question as to 
the validity of an arbitration agreement agreed to by “a prospective employee 
and thus prior to the decision to accept employment.”62  Against the backdrop 
of this and other open questions left by cases handling illusory promises and 
at-will employment in an arbitration enforcement context, Baker v. Bristol 
Care has tied up some loose ends. 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
A.  The Majority 
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in an opinion by Judge Richard B. 
Teitelman, first considered the threshold arbitrability question of whether 
“the arbitrator should decide any questions of enforceability” rather than the 
court.63  Bristol pointed to the 2010 Supreme Court of the United States case 
of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,64 where a clause within a party’s 
arbitration agreement delegated authority to an “arbitrator, not the courts” to 
“resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability 
or formation of [that] Agreement.”65  The instant court distinguished Bristol’s 
proffered case from the present circumstances by indicating that Baker’s pur-
ported agreement “does not delegate to the arbitrator disputes regarding con-
tract formation,” and that “a contract formation issue rather than an applica-
bility or enforceability issue” was raised here.66  While not forgetting that 
“federal law preempts state laws that invalidate arbitration agreements on 
 
 59. Perbal v. Dazor Mfg. Corp., 436 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Mo. 1968). 
 60. Pub. Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Simmons, 409 S.W.3d 538, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2013) (citing Parker v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 882 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994)). 
 61. Rabius v. Brandon, 257 S.W.3d 641, 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“There is a 
presumption in favor of a construction of a contract that will uphold its validity, if 
reasonably available.”) (citing Magruder Quarry & Co. v. Briscoe, 83 S.W.3d 647, 
652 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)); see also Dickemann v. Millwood Golf & Racquet Club, 
Inc., 67 S.W.3d 724, 728-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 62. Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 445 n.23 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 63. Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 772-73 (Mo. 2014) (en banc), 
reh’g denied (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 64. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
 65. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 774 (quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 130) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 66. Id. at 774. 
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public policy grounds,” the instant court identified this to be “a contract for-
mation issue . . . subject to resolution by the Missouri state courts.”67 
The court found that “Baker’s promotion, continued employment and at-
tendant benefits” did not constitute valid consideration.68  It characterized 
many of the parties’ promises as “incidents of Baker’s continued at-will em-
ployment” and the provision entitling Baker to severance pay as “a term and 
condition of [Baker’s] at-will employment.”  In other words, these were not 
viewed as separate and distinct promises that might serve as consideration.69  
The instant court followed the Morrow case in holding “that continued at-will 
employment is not valid consideration to support an agreement requiring the 
employee to arbitrate . . . claims against the employer.”70  The court then 
proceeded to evaluate whether Baker remained an at-will employee of Bristol 
after the parties’ purported agreements.71 
To resolve the question of Baker’s employment status, the court accept-
ed the proposition that “[k]ey indicia of at-will employment include indefinite 
duration o[f] employment and the employer’s option to terminate the em-
ployment immediately without cause.”72  The court found that the parties’ 
agreement met these indicia when it not only “provide[d] that Baker’s em-
ployment would ‘continue indefinitely’” but also allowed the employment’s 
termination “‘at [Bristol’s] sole option’” with either notice five days prior to 
termination or no notice but five days’ pay instead.73  Even more indicative of 
Baker’s at-will employment was the language from the arbitration agreement, 
which provided that it did “not alter [Baker]’s status as an at-will employ-
ee.”74  The court further noted that, because “[d]ocuments that are executed 
contemporaneously are considered together as a single agreement,” to harmo-
nize the various provisions, the arbitration agreement’s acknowledgment of 
Baker’s at-will employment status would govern.75  Thus, “Baker’s continued 
at-will employment” did not “provide consideration supporting an obligation 
to arbitrate.”76 
The court went on to deny Bristol’s argument that the parties’ mutual 
promises to arbitrate were valid consideration.77  To be consideration under 
Morrow, such promises “must be binding, not illusory,” as is the case when 
one can “unilateral[ly] . . . amend the agreement and avoid its obligations.”78  
Because Bristol retained the “unilateral ‘right to amend, modify, or revoke 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 774, 777. 
 69. Id. at 776. 
 70. Id. at 775. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 776. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
9
Byrd: Byrd: When Arbitration Agreement Provisions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
528 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
this [arbitration] agreement upon (30) days’ prior written notice to [Baker]’” 
– a claimed right that the court did not find to be restricted even from retroac-
tive modifications or revocations – the purported mutual arbitration promise 
was found illusory and not a viable option for providing consideration.79  The 
court rejected Bristol’s counter-argument, which relied on a case from the 
Federal Eastern District of Oklahoma,80 that “the notice requirement in the 
arbitration agreement renders the promise sufficiently binding” by, inter alia, 
distinguishing the case insofar as it did not involve the threat of retroactive 
“amendment of the arbitration agreement.”81 
The court thus decided that the parties’ purported arbitration agreement 
was invalid due to lack of consideration for two reasons.82  First, Baker’s 
continued at-will employment was insufficient for consideration; the arbitra-
tion agreement’s overt statement that Baker’s at-will status was left un-
changed, the indefinite duration of the employment, and Bristol’s option to 
terminate Baker’s employment at will made Baker’s status as an at-will em-
ployee apparent to the majority.83  Second, Bristol’s promise was illusory: the 
illusory nature was shown by Bristol’s reservation of a “unilateral ‘right to . . 
. modify or revoke’” the agreement even retrospectively and, therefore, did 
not constitute consideration.84 
B.  The Dissent 
The rather thorough dissenting opinion by Judge Paul C. Wilson began 
by agreeing with the majority that “there was only one agreement between . . 
. Baker and Bristol Care concerning her employment.”85  Nevertheless, it 
went on to disagree with the majority’s decision that the agreement lacked 
consideration.86  The dissent noted that under the Federal Arbitration Act, 
although it “looks to state law to decide the threshold questions of contract 
formation,” the use of state law is limited “only to those principles of state 
law that apply generally to all contracts.”87  Thus an attempt “to apply special 
rules for the formation of contracts containing promises to arbitrate,” includ-
ing on matters of consideration, should fail under the FAA.88 
The dissent began to ground its opinion by giving an elementary over-
view of the basic requirements for consideration: (1) that there be a bar-
gained-for exchange with a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the 
 
 79. Id. at 776-77. 
 80. Id. at 777 (citing Pierce v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 
1212, 1215-16 (E.D. Okla. 2003)). 
 81. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 777. 
 82. Id. 777. 
 83. Id. at 774-76. 
 84. Id. at 776-77. 
 85. Id. at 777-78 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 778. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 778-79. 
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promisee, (2) that “[c]ourts have no authority to attempt to value the bar-
gained-for consideration in an effort to determine whether” the consideration 
is “adequate,” and (3) “that all contemporaneous promises by one party are 
deemed to have been given in exchange for the aggregate benefit to that party 
or the aggregate detriment to the other party.”89  With this groundwork laid, 
the dissent then raised the distinction between Baker’s employment before 
making the agreement that gave rise to this action and her employment after 
making that agreement.90  The dissent specified the former as a “simple uni-
lateral contract,” while the latter was based (in the dissent’s view) on a bilat-
eral agreement for, and in exchange of, numerous promises, which the dis-
senting opinion listed at length.91 
The dissent denied various arguments against its position that Baker’s 
arbitration promise was supported by consideration.92  Countering Baker’s 
contention “that her promise to arbitrate . . . is not enforceable because that 
promise was not supported by separate consideration,” the dissent identified 
that same arbitration promise as “one of the many promises . . . bargained 
for,” but proceeded to examine how, even if separate consideration were re-
quired, such consideration would be met, among other things, by (1) “Bristol 
Care’s promise to arbitrate [Baker’s] claims . . .” and (2) Bristol’s promise 
“to arbitrate any specified claims it may wish to assert against her.”93  The 
dissent rejected the notion that Bristol’s promises under the arbitration 
agreement were illusory.94  Although the agreement permitted “Bristol Care 
the right to ‘amend, modify, or revoke th[e] agreement upon thirty (30) days’ 
prior written notice,’” the American Arbitration Association rules that the 
parties agreed to give Bristol “no right to alter the agreement as to any claim 
pending at the time of . . . any notice from Bristol Care that it was intending 
to change the agreement.”95 
The dissent further rejected the construction the majority gave to the 
agreement, in which Bristol had reserved for itself the ability to retroactively 
modify the effect of the arbitration agreement.96  In support of this rejection, 
the dissent first stated that “[t]here [was] no question that the construction of 
this provision . . . [was] the one th[e] court would adopt if Bristol Care were 
trying to realize a retrospective advantage.”97  Next, the dissent cited to Per-
bal v. Dazor Manufacturing Corp., which expressed the rule that, of two po-
tential contract constructions, the construction rendering a contract valid “is 
 
 89. Id. at 779-82. 
 90. Id. at 784. 
 91. Id. at 784-86. 
 92. Id. at 786. 
 93. Id. at 786-87. 
 94. Id. at 788. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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preferred.”98  Third, the dissent quoted the language of the Baker-Bristol arbi-
tration agreement itself, which provided that the agreement should be modi-
fied by the court “to render it enforceable.”99 
The dissent then argued that the other benefits Bristol gave sufficed as 
consideration for Baker’s arbitration promise.100  As to the facts and the legal 
questions involved, the court distinguished this present case from the case of 
Morrow101 and found that Morrow did not uphold Baker’s claim that she was 
an at will employee or that the agreement in question in this case was without 
consideration.102  “Even if Ms. Baker were an ‘at will’ employee under . . . 
Morrow,” the dissent explained, “this Court has never held that such an ar-
rangement fails to supply consideration . . . .”103  The dissent further argued 
that, because of “[d]ecades of decisions rejecting Morrow’s holding outside 
the context of arbitration,” application of the now arbitration-specific rule in 
Morrow would amount to a violation of the FAA’s requirement of applying 
only a state’s general contract principles in a court’s contract-formation anal-
ysis of arbitration provisions.104  Therefore, for the above reasons, the dissent 
would have carried out Bristol’s motion to compel arbitration.105 
V.  COMMENT 
As a recently decided case, how Baker will be interpreted and used by 
future courts will be instrumental in determining its effects on Missouri.  As 
of this writing, Baker had already been cited by the Eighth Circuit in Crews v. 
Monarch Fire Protection District106 and in the Missouri Court of Appeals 
case of Seay v. Jones.107  It was used in Seay to bear the proposition that “[a] 
promise is illusory when one party retains the unilateral right to amend [an] 
agreement and avoid its obligations.”108  Hidden behind this tame statement 
lies a host of issues: a tension between Baker and a significant weight of prior 
Missouri contract doctrine, a future reconciliation between federal courts 
interpreting Missouri law and the development of Missouri law by the state 
courts, expressions of both problematic and beneficial policy, and effects and 
opportunities that wade in Baker’s wake.  These issues are sifted out below. 
 
 98. 436 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Mo. 1968) (“Where an agreement is susceptible of two 
constructions, one of which renders the contract invalid and the other sustains its 
validity, the latter construction is preferred.”). 
 99. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 788. 
 100. Id. at 788-89. 
 101. Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 102. Id. at 789-92. 
 103. Id. at 791. 
 104. Id. at 792. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Crews v. Monarch Fire Prot. Dist., 771 F.3d 1085, 1091 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 107. Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 108. Id. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/9
2015] ARBITRATION AGREEMENT TIME TRAVEL 531 
A.  Federal Impact 
The majority in Baker directly answered a question that Frye never 
reached: whether “mere advance notice” in a “unilateral right to amend an 
agreement” would comport with Missouri law.109  This question was an-
swered in the negative; Baker clearly showed that, at the least, notice alone 
does not suffice to rescue a unilaterally amendable arbitration agreement from 
invalidity.110  Baker also openly attempted to heal a rift between Missouri law 
and its use by the federal courts on the issue of whether continued employ-
ment is sufficient for consideration.111  In Canterbury v. Parson’s Construc-
tors, Inc., cited by Baker, the federal court for the Western District of Mis-
souri indicated that continued employment would constitute sufficient con-
sideration for an arbitration agreement.112  Canterbury attempted to distin-
guish its facts from Morrow by pointing out that, while Morrow dealt with a 
prior “existing at-will employment relationship,” Canterbury dealt with “a 
condition of future employment” (which that court thought would suffice for 
consideration).113  Baker denied, or at least cast serious doubt on, that distinc-
tion.114  Following the Erie doctrine115 and the control of individual states 
over their substantive contract law, one may expect future federal courts that 
look to Missouri contract law to refrain from considering continued at-will 
employment as consideration. 
B.  Implications for Missouri Precedent 
In answering Frye’s question, the majority went far in interpreting the 
arbitration agreement’s amendment and revocation provision to apply retroac-
tively.116  As the dissent argued, and as is borne out by an examination of the 
case law, the majority’s interpretation of the agreement in this way breaks 
with the substantial precedent in Missouri to interpret agreements in favor of 
validity.117  It is evident that reasonable readers of the agreement’s language, 
which gave Bristol a “right to amend, modify or revoke th[e] agreement upon 
thirty (30) days’ prior written notice to the Employee,”118 would be capable 
 
 109. Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 110. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 777. 
 111. Id. at 774-75. 
 112. Canterbury v. Parsons Constructors, Inc., 2009 WL 899661, at *1 n.* (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009) (“While plaintiff would equate hiring an employee to an at-will posi-
tion as meaningless consideration for an agreement to arbitrate disputes, I doubt the 
Missouri courts will adopt such an unrealistic view.”). 
 113. Id. at *1. 
 114. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 775 n.3. 
 115. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). 
 116. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 776-77. 
 117. See supra Parts III-IV. 
 118. Baker, 450 S.W.3d 770 at 776. 
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of interpreting this provision as applying prospectively and need not expect to 
find an express limitation on Bristol’s ability to make retroactively effective 
amendments.  Although the agreement itself contained a provision asking the 
court to construe it so as to make it valid,119 the court did not appear to take 
any pains to adhere to this provision. 
Although the dissent attempted at length to separate out the different 
promises, benefits, and detriments exchanged between Baker and Bristol, the 
majority seemed to have found inklings of consideration for Baker’s arbitra-
tion promise only in two consideration candidates: an offer of continued at-
will employment, and Bristol’s arbitration agreement.120  While following 
Morrow’s lead by holding “an offer of continued at-will employment” to fail 
as consideration, the majority couched the alterations and benefits that ac-
companied Baker’s employment after signing the agreement as mere “inci-
dents of that employment” and her severance pay as “a term and condition of 
her at-will employment.”121  It is unclear from this opinion how far such a 
characterization could be extended and at what point an offer of increased 
wages and other benefits to a present at-will employee might become consid-
eration under Baker.  The proposition that not even an employee’s promotion 
will qualify as consideration runs directly contrary to the gist of the Minneso-
ta court’s reasoning in Jostens.122 
An important potential implication of this decision is that, following the 
FAA’s prohibition on applying unique contract rules that would disfavor the 
formation of arbitration agreements,123 it seems that each of the key rules that 
were fatal to the validity of Baker and Bristol’s agreement would apply not 
only to arbitration agreements and contracts with arbitration provisions, but to 
all contracts, or at least all employment contracts, under Missouri law.  Thus, 
depending on how Missouri courts act post-Baker, Missourians might expect 
to discover offers of continued at-will employment, even with increased wag-
es, in exchange for non-compete promises, mediation agreements, and per-
haps confidentiality agreements to be found without real consideration.  Con-
tract provisions that permit one party to unilaterally amend or revoke the 
agreement or a portion of the agreement, even with extensive notice, will 
seem to require explicit mention of their solely prospective application, or 
else they may be interpreted as potentially having a retroactive effect and 
therefore be considered illusory. 
 
 119. Id. at 788 (observing agreement called for the court to “modify . . . it to ren-
der it enforceable”) (emphasis removed). 
 120. Id. at 774, 784-86. 
 121. Id. at 775-76. 
 122. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982). 
 123. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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C.  Costs, Benefits 
Perhaps this potential outcome is for the best in the long run, as “es-
cape” clauses permitting a party to unilaterally amend or revoke an agreement 
appear disingenuous even with notice, especially in an employment context in 
which there may be an uneven balance of power.  In the meantime, however, 
Baker might give leave to courts within Missouri to look more exactingly at 
employment contracts; to disavow continued at-will employment agreements 
that might be construed as enforceable, even where the agreement and a line 
of Missouri case law specifically call out for the court to discretionally con-
strue it as enforceable to the extent that it can reasonably be so construed; and 
to find a variety of arbitration clauses or agreements imposed on employees 
to be without consideration. 
The cost of uncertainty in both employment law generally and arbitra-
tion contract enforceability in particular may also increase the effective risk 
or cost of maintaining current employment levels in Missouri.124  The uncer-
tainty caused by this decision may concretely affect employer costs in a varie-
ty of ways: an employer’s counsel could hear of this case and take his client’s 
time and money to create more protective practices in contracting arbitration 
agreements with employees.  Likewise, employees may hear of this decision 
and (rightfully) fear that an already-signed arbitration agreement will be ren-
dered ineffective, causing them to incur expenses or inconvenience in seeking 
to modify their arbitration agreement or to negotiate for a new one.  Also 
possible is that, after a claim has arisen, employers and employees may see 
this decision as encouragement to dispute the arbitrability of a claim under 
their arbitration agreement if they think litigation would be in their favor.  
Any disincentive to create arbitration contracts will likely put more strain on 
the court systems’ already limited resources.125 
D.  Potential Effects on Arbitration Agreement Drafting 
However, these effects are not entirely unavoidable for employers and 
at-will employees.  Following Baker, to reduce ambiguity in whether or not 
the purported consideration for a new or promoted employee’s arbitration (or 
other) agreement is actually consideration or else merely an “incident of em-
ployment,” employers might consider treating the agreement as though it 
were an entirely distinct bilateral contract.  This would require ensuring that 
the contract is signed distinctly from a new employment contract on a sepa-
rate day126 and with an entirely different benefit that is not at all triggered or 
 
 124. Cf. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Re-
form, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 539 (2011) (remarking on the costs of uncertainty in tort 
law). 
 125. See generally Leon Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court Con-
gestion, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 182 (1965-1966). 
 126. Note the element of contemporaneousness in Baker.  450 S.W.3d at 773. 
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received on account of the at-will employee’s employment or behavior during 
employment. 
Likewise, to create an arbitration (or other) agreement with a unilateral 
amendment or revocation provision in accord with Baker – while avoiding 
the “retroactive” construction given to Bristol’s similar provision127 – it 
would seem that the addition of a statement explicitly limiting that provision 
to a prospective effect after notice would accomplish the job.  In Part III of 
this Note, this sort of clause was referred to as a “Haliburton type savings 
clause,”128 and the specific language of the clause used in the original Hali-
burton case was that “no amendment shall apply to a dispute of which the 
sponsor had actual notice on the date of the amendment.”129  Under the rea-
soning of Baker, inclusion of a similar clause in a Missouri employer-
employee arbitration agreement may prevent a construction of that agreement 
as illusory due to retroactivity. 
Along with promising a definite term of employment as consideration 
for an arbitration agreement to increase the likelihood of enforceability,130 
Missouri employers might also resort to the repugnant practice of firing their 
at-will employees and rehiring them on condition that they sign an arbitration 
agreement.  The purported consideration arguably would then not be contin-
ued at-will employment, but rather an offer of new at-will employment.  Ad-
ditionally, when the court distinguished Baker from the U.S. Supreme Court 
case of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,131 it implied that, had the arbi-
tration agreement conferred authority on the arbitrator to “resolve any dispute 
relating to the . . . formation of th[e] [a]greement,” the employee’s case chal-
lenging arbitrability would be heard by the arbitrator and not the court.132 
E.  Judicial Opportunities the Next Time Around 
Different reasoning in this decision may have evaded some of the poten-
tially negative consequences of Baker while still arriving at the same result.  
One commentator has generally criticized the beneficent but counter-intuitive 
interpretation of contract language, saying that it “rest[ed] on the admission 
that the clauses in question [were] permissible in purpose . . . [and] invite[d] 
the draftsman to recur to the attack” and that it “seriously embarrassed later 
efforts at true construction . . . .”133  Arguably the clause permitting Bristol to 
amend or revoke the arbitration agreement was beneficently construed as 
 
 127. Id. at 772-73. 
 128. Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 129. In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tex. 2002). 
 130. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 775 (“Key indicia of at-will employment include indef-
inite duration o[f] employment.”). 
 131. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
 132. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 774. 
 133. K. N. Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English 
and Continental Law by O. Prausnitz. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 52 HARV. L. REV. 
700, 703 (1939) (book review). 
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applying retroactively, even though this interpretation seems contrary to the 
apparent prospective reach of that clause; if this is the case, the court’s inter-
pretation meets the above commentator’s criticism.  Instead of using some-
times implicit, counter-intuitive interpretive rules to exclude the matter of 
Baker’s promotion and Bristol’s promise to arbitrate from acting as consider-
ation, the court could have used a direct, policy-based contract formation rule 
to achieve the same effect.  Such a rule could take a variety of forms, includ-
ing a prohibition on quasi-illusory134 employer promises as consideration for 
an employee agreement that will outlast the course of the employment rela-
tionship, or a requirement of separate consideration, besides continued or 
terminated-then-renewed employment, in exchange for a promise that will 
take effect after an employee has left work or has been terminated.  Because 
the FAA135 and the case-law interpreting it136 require that the court only apply 
generally applicable contract rules in evaluating the formation of an arbitra-
tion agreement, any policy-based contract formation rule substituting for the 
reasoning in Baker would also need to apply generally and not solely to arbi-
tration agreement formation. 
F.  Political Use, or Lack Thereof 
This case might be used inappropriately as fodder for those who oppose 
the Missouri Court Plan.137  Opposition to the Missouri Court Plan may see 
Baker as another indicator of the litigiousness and hostility to arbitration that 
follows from a judicial selection process that makes heavy use of attorneys, 
rather than a democratic election system, to select its judges.138  But this view 
is weakened by the majority’s specific mention of “entrenched judicial hostil-
ity toward arbitration contracts” as a purpose of the FAA139 and by the dis-
sent’s veiled accusation that the majority might be relying on “lingering judi-
cial hostility toward arbitration.”140  The latter remark is more significant, 
since it shows how the Missouri Court Plan, rather than imbuing its candi-
dates with the overwhelming propensity to support expansive litigation, has 
ultimately provided at the very least three Supreme Court of Missouri judges 
who are sensitive to hostility against arbitration.  Ultimately, then, it seems 
 
 134. This term is not a hapax legonomen but has been used before.  E.g. Roger 
Bernhardt, The Cost of Free Looks-Ruminations on Steiner v. Thexton, GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. (2010), available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/382.  As used 
here, this term would encompass promises that are almost illusory, as Bristol’s prom-
ise would have been, had it not been interpreted as it was in Baker. 
 135. 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2012). 
 136. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 778-79. 
 137. See generally Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, MO. CTS., http://www.
courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=297 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
 138. Id.  However, the Missouri Plan requires judges to stand for a “retention 
election” after a year so that the democratic process is used.  Id. 
 139. Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 778 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 787. 
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unwise for the opposition to the Missouri Court Plan to put this case in its 
quiver against a Plan that has been spoken well of by at least one former Su-
preme Court of Missouri judge141 and has found bipartisan support in the last 
Missouri gubernatorial election.142 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Baker’s holding that mere continued at-will employment and an illuso-
ry, unilaterally and retroactively alterable promise to arbitrate are insufficient 
to support a purported arbitration agreement has simultaneously clarified and 
obscured Missouri contract law and may leave employers and employees 
alike on tenterhooks as to whether their next attempt at creating an arbitration 
(or other) contract will be upheld.  Though there may be ways to win greater 
certainty of the validity of these contracts, Baker has given advance notifica-
tion to makers of employment agreements that the days of courts finding a 
contract’s validity by liberal construction, even when the contract demands it, 
might be over. 
 
 141. Paul Koepp, Retired Supreme Court Judge: Preserve Independence of Mis-
souri Judiciary, KAN. CITY BUS. J. (Oct. 3, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.bizjournals.
com/kansascity/blog/2012/10/retired-supreme-court-judge-preserve.html?page=all. 
 142. Missouri Governor Candidates Oppose Court Ballot Measure, CBS ST. 
LOUIS (Oct. 15, 2012, 7:06 AM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2012/10/15/missouri-
governor-candidates-oppose-court-ballot-measure/. 
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